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less efficient than the pumping of normal vertically-drilled wells, operations will become unprofitable more quickly than they otherwise might, resulting in a loss of an
additional portion of the oil and gas. Third, the grantee may find it difficult or impossible to secure drilling rights from a neighbor who can himself drain the oil and gas from
beneath the tract without incurring liability to either the owner of the surface or the
owner of the right to take the oil.
Further difficulties will result. Any rule which would separate the right to use the
surface from the right to take oil and gas would lessen the alienability of both the surface and sub-surface rights to the tract. The separation might preclude the effective
operation and administration of proration or unitization plans for petroleum conservation,21 since the mechanics of these plans are based upon surface area. It would thus
seem preferable to hold that both the right, express or implied, to use the surface and
the right to take the oil and gas must be present in order to sustain a lease or grant of
these minerals.22
Suretyship-Protection of Co-makers under Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of I94o-[New York].-The plaintiff, co-maker of a note made by a person later inducted into military service, sought a stay of enforcement of his liability on the note
under Section ro3 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o.' Held, that
Section io3 authorizes stays only in favor of sureties, guarantors, and endorsers and
hence is inapplicable to co-makers. In re Itzkowitz.'
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 19403 is virtually a reenactment of the
1918 act 4 of the same title. To protect the man in service from undue hardship the act
21These plans are designed to prevent physical and economic waste of oil and gas through
cooperative development by all the owners of land overlying a common source of supply.
N.M. Stat. Ann. (Courtwright, Supp. 1938) c. 97, § 812; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, Supp.
1939) §§ 55-603, 55-604; Okla. Stat. (Harlow, Supp. i94o) § 11574; La. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Dart, Supp. 1939) § 9482; Ark. Acts (I939) 219.

- Courts discussing the problem indicate that the right to take oil cannot exist without the
right to use the surface. Morgan v. McGee, 117 Okla. 212, 245 Pac. 888 (1926);.see Richfield
Oil Co. v. Hercules Gasoline Co., 112 Cal. App. 431, 434, 297 Pac. 73, 75 (193); In reLathrap,
6i F. (2d) 37,41 (C.C.A. 9th 1932). In the instant case the court mentions the unreported Illi-

nois circuit court opinion, Roth v. Texas Oil Co., which held that where the deed expressly
provided that the right to mine should not include the right to break the surface, the grant of
minerals did not convey the right to drill for oil. The court distinguishes the Roth case as
dealing with the original grant and not with the effect of a condition subsequent as in the
instant case. However, since the basic question in either case is whether the right to the surface may be effectively separated from the right to take the oil and gas, there seems to be no
distinction between such separation in an original grant and separation as the result of operation of a condition subsequent.
154 Stat. 1178, at § 103 (x94o), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 513 (Supp. 194). This section
1918 act. 4o Stat. 44o (i918), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § io4 (Supp.
'94').
2 177 Misc. 269, 30 N.Y.S. (2d) 336 (S. Ct. 1941).
3 54 Stat. 1178, at § ioo et seq. (i94o), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 51o et seq. (Supp.

is identical with § 103 of the

194').
4 4o Stat. 44o, at § too et seq. (I918), 5o U.S.C.A. App. § ioi et seq. (Supp. 1941). The
few changes in phraseology were made because the United States was not at war in 194o.
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provides for the exercise of discretionary'moratory power by the courts.s In the performance of this function the courts are primarily influenced by two considerations:
first, whether the man in service is able to appear and defend, and second, whether a
default on an obligation by reason of the change in his income will lead to an unjust
forfeiture. 6 Section IO3 of both the i918 and i94o acts is entitled "Protection of persons secondarily liable" and reads:
(i) Whenever pursuant to any of the provisions of this Act the enforcement of any obligation or liability, the prosecution of any suit or proceeding, the entry or enforcement of any
order, writ, judgment, or decree, or the performance of any other act, maybe stayed, postponed, or suspended, such stay, postponement, or suspension may, in the discretion of the
court, likewise be granted to sureties, guarantors,endorsers, and others subject to the obligation
or liability,the performance or enforcement of which is stayed, postponed, or suspended.
(2) When a judgment or decreels vacated or set aside in whole or in part, as provided in this
Act, the same may, in the discretion of the court, likewise be set aside and vacated as to any
surety, guarantor,endorser,or other person liableupon the contract or liabilityfor the enforcement
of which the judgment or decree was entered.7
The question whether accommodation makers or co-makers,8 who are not specifically mentioned, are protected has arisen in four cases, 9 and only the instant case holds
that they are not. Congressional reports fail to disclose the policy behind the inclusion
of Section io3 in the statute. It may be suggested, however, that were service in the
armed forces made a purely personal defense, available only to the principal debtor xo
s 54 Stat. 1178, at §§
530 (Supp. 1941).

103, 201, 203,

204, 300 (r94o), 5o U.S.C.A. App.

§§

513, 521, 523, 524,

6 Cortland Savings Bank v. Ivory, 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 313 (S. Ct. 1941) (court prevented mortgage foreclosure by allowing defendant in service to make small paynients); Griswold v. Cady,
27 N.Y.S.

(2d)

302

(S. Ct. 1941) (in personalinjury suit stay granted to wife of man in service);

Jamaica Savings Bank v. Bryan, 175 Misc. 978, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 17 (S. Ct. 1941), motion to
strike granted 176 Misc. 215, 25 N.Y.S. (2d) 641 (S. Ct. 194) (stay not granted to one who
has only nominal interest in mortgaged premises); Fennell v. Frisch's Adm'r, 192 Ky. 535,
234 S.W. 198 (1921) (stay not granted to a defendant who was able to appear); Ilderton v.
Charleston Consolidated R. Co., 113 S.C. 91, ior S.E. 282 (igig) (defendant employer granted
stay where employee was in service and could not appear to testify); Dietz v. Treupel, 184
App. Div. 448, 17o N.Y. Supp. io8 (igiS) (stay not granted to soldier whose complaint was
inability to advertise property to be sold at judicial sale).
7 Italics added.
8 N.Y. Negotiable Instruments Law (McKinney, 1917) § 55 defines an accommodation
party as

"....

one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser,

without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person.
Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at
the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party."
9 In re Itzkowitz, 177 Misc. 269, 30 N.Y.S. (2d) 336 (S. Ct. i94); Akron Auto Finance Co.
v. Stonebraker, 66 Ohio App. 507, 35 N.E. (2d) 585 (1941); Morris Plan Bank v. Waldman,
C.C.H. War Law Serv.
9,sr (Munic. Ct. D.C. 194); Modern Industrial Bank v. Zaentz,
177 Misc. 132, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 969 (Munic. Ct. 1941). Only the last case considers the question whether a stay must be granted to the man in service before the court may protect other
defendants under § io3. There is no record of cases involving co-makers under § io3 of the
1918 act.

10 The Availability of a Principal's Defenses to His Uncompensated Surety, 46 Yale L. J.

833, 834, 835 (1937).
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security parties would ultimately be called upon to bear a burden which, before the
passage of the Selective Service Act, was not within their expectations." And if secuTity parties werepermitted to seek reimbursement from the principal debtors, the entire
purpose of the relief act would be nullified. 2 Mere non-mention of sureties who sign as
co-makers is hardly sufficient to bar them from protection under Section io3, in view
of the statutory language extending protection to "sureties, guarantors, endorsers, and
others subject to the obligation."13 Indeed the principle of ejusdem generis14 suggests that
co-makers are included, since it is well-settled that security parties who sign as comakers are sureties.'s
It may be argued that the title of Section 103, "Protection of persons secondarily liable," impliedly excludes accommodation makers, 6 who are primarily liable.7 This
argument proves too much, however, since sureties, who are specifically mentioned, are
also primarily liable."8 Thus, the inclusion of sdireties strongly supports the conclusion
" For example, the principal debtor's service in the armed forces may be distinguished from
bankruptcy which is one of the risks against which the surety secured the creditor. The
Availability of a Principal's Defenses to His Uncompensated Surety, 46 Yale L.J. 833, 835 n. 22
(1937).
1254 Stat. 1178, at § ioo (194o), So U.S.C.A. App. § 510 (Supp. 1941).
13 Italics added.

Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 422 (Lewis' ed. i9o4).
s Read v. Cutts, 7 Greenl. (Me.) i86 (183I); Hederman v. Cox, 188 Miss.

'4 2

21, 193 So. 19
(i94o); Bellows v. Blake, io6 Vt. 204, 17o Atl. 9o6 (1934); Sturges, Suretyship and Guaranty,
14 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 482, 485 (1934); 1 Brandt, Law of Suretyship and Guaranty § i n. i (3d

ed. 19o); Rowlatt, Law of Principal and Surety 5 (I899). TheNew Yorkcases on this point,
however, are in confusion. Cases squarely holding that a co-maker is a surety are: Goldberg
v.Albert, i1 Misc. 281, 291 N.Y. Supp. 855 (Munic. Ct. x936); Salzberg v. Deutsch, 15o Misc.
870,

270 N.Y.

Supp. 595 (Munic. Ct. 1934); Horton v. Dow, io N.Y. St. Rep. 139 (S. Ct. 1887);

cf. Modem Industrial Bank v. Zaentz, 177 Misc. 132, 134, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 969, 972 (Munic. Ct.
1941) (questioning New York authority that co-makers are not sureties). Contra: Adamson
N.Y. Supp. 5o6 (i937); Nat'l Citizens' Bank v. Toplitz,
(1903), aff'd on other grounds 178 N.Y. 464, 71 N.E.i
(19o4); In the Matter of the Estate of Craven, 171 Misc. 825, 13 N.Y.S. (2d) 987 (Surr. Ct.
1939); Stricks v. Siegel, '35 Misc. 6o8, 238 N.Y. Supp. 154 (Munic. Ct. 1929), modified 138
Misc. 266, 245 N.Y. Supp. 372 (S. Ct. 1930).
'6 N.Y. Negotiable Instruments Law (McKinney, 1917) § 3 defines primary liability and
v. Adamson, 251 App. Div. 187,

8i App. Div. 593, 81 N.Y. Supp.

295

422

secondary liability as follows: "The person 'primarily' liable on an instrument is the person
who by the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same. All other parties
are 'secondarily' liable." The Negotiable Instruments Law has no definition of the nature of

the liability of a surety. See Goldberg v. Albert, xi6 Misc. 281, 283, 291 N.Y. Supp. 855 , 857
(Munic. Ct. x936).
17 Modem Industrial Bank v. Zaentz, 177 Misc. 132, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 969 (Munic. Ct. 1941);
Adamson v. Adamson, 251 App. Div. 187, 295 N.Y. Supp. 5o6 (1937); Davenport & Harris

Undertaking Co. v. Roberson, 219 Ala.
litz, 81 App. Div. 593, 81 N.Y. Supp.

203, 121
422

So. 733

(1929);

Nat'l Citizens' Bank v. Top-

(1903), aff'd on other grounds 178 N.Y. 464, 71

N.E. i (i9o4).

IsNewark Finance Corp. v. Acocella, ii 5 NJ.L. 388, i8o At. 862 (1935); Howell v.
Com'r, 69 F. (2d) 447 (C.C.A. 8th 1934); Peterson v. Miller Rubber Co., 2 4 F. (2d) 59 (C.C.A.
8th X928); 4 Williston, Contracts § 1211 (rev. ed. 1936); Sturges, Suretyship and Guaranty,
14 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 482, 484 (1934). Arant, Law of Suretyship and Guaranty § 16, at 24
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that the term "secondarily liable" was not used in its technical sense but was merely
intended to indicate those persons whose liability on an obligation is other than that of
principal debtor.
There appear to be no reasons of policy for excluding co-makers from Section io3.
Contract clauses spelling out the liability of the principal debtor indicate that it makes
little real difference to loan companies whether the obligation is secured by a co-maker
or by another type of surety.19 In view of the many variations on the suretyship relation, however, loan companies ordinarily designate utncompensated security parties as
co-makers since this type of surety is specifically and narrowly defined by statute,20 and
confusion and uncertainty is thus avoided. But this mere convenience in terminology
should not lead to a substantial difference in result and should not bar accommodation
makers from the group protected by Section io3. Furthermore, when it is considered
that a compensated surety may be protected by Section 1o3, it becomes even more
difficult to support a result whereby an accommodation maker, who by definition derives no benefit from the obligation incurred, is not protected. And finally, the practice of interpreting the act liberally- justifies the inclusion in Section io3 of all persons
who, though not named, are situated similarly to those specifically covered.

Taxation-Immunity from Sales Tax of Contractors under Construction Contracts with United States-[United States].-On the order of "cost-plus-a-fixed-fee"
contractors the plaintiff, an Alabama lumber dealer, sold building materials to be used
in the construction of an army camp in the same state. Pursuant to a state statute' imposing a tax on the gross retail sales price of tangible personal property, the plaintiff
was assessed on the basis of these sales. The assessment was protested, the United
States intervened on behalf of the plaintiff, and an appeal was taken to the state courts.
On certiorari from the United States Supreme Court to the Supreme Court of Alabama,
held, that the immunity of the Government implied from the Constitution did not
extend to the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractors,' since they and not the United States
Government had purchased the materials; and that the plaintiff could have exacted
the tax from the contractors and is therefore subject to the assessment, despite the
fact that under the construction contract the Government had agreed to pay all costs
(193 i), states that, "The contracts of the surety, guarantor and indorser are all accessory, but
the former is primarily liable while the two latter are only secondarily liable."
'9 Thus, for example, the instrument involved in Modem Industrial Bank v. Zaentz, 177
Misc. 132, 135, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 969, 973 (Munic. Ct. 194), provides that ".... the undersigned
shall .... provide such additional co-makers, guarantors or sureties as shall be satisfactory
to the holder .... that the holder thereof may accept other co-makers, guarantors, sureties .......
20Note 8 supra.

21Dietz v. Treupel, 184 App. Div. 448, 17o N.Y. Supp. ioS (x918); Griswold v. Cady, 27
N.Y.S. (2d) 302 (S. Ct. 194), noted in 55 Harv. L. Rev. 304 (1941) (§ IO3 extended to protect
a wife who was jointly liable with her husband, a soldier, in a negligence action).
x Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1941) tit. 51, §§ 752-86.
'This conclusion is inferred from the Court's opinion. See discussion accompanying notes
21 and 22 infra.

